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In 1999, Poland reformed its public pension system so as to ensure its 
solvency, altering the benefit formula and increasing the statutory retirement 
age. This paper examines the 1999 reform to estimate the response of private 
saving to changes in public pension wealth—that is, to identify the extent to 
which private saving substitutes for mandatory public pension wealth—using 
the fact that the reform had a differential impact on individuals depending on 
their year of birth. Individuals who were older than 50 years at the time of the 
reform were not directly affected by the reform and were allowed to stay in the 
pre-reform system with high benefit-to-salary replacement rates. Individuals 
who were 50 years old or younger at the time of the reform were to receive 
pension benefits computed according to a less generous post-reform pension 
formula. The reform therefore created large variation among people of similar 
ages in expected public pension wealth, providing a setting similar to a natural 
experiment.  
Longer life expectancy and falling fertility have led to reform of many 
countries’ public pension systems, and understanding how such reforms are 
likely to affect private saving is important because resources accumulated as 
private savings affect investment in capital, economic growth, and living 
standards. Accordingly, the degree of substitution between public pension 
wealth and private saving is a key aspect of debates over public pension 
reform. 
We begin by estimating a set of difference-in-differences regressions, 
where we calculate the change in household saving rates and expenditures 
before and after the reform for the affected and unaffected cohorts. Next, in 
order to estimate the degree of substitution between private saving and public 
pension wealth, we calculate expected pension wealth under the pre-reform 
and post-reform legislation for every household and relate this variable to the 
observed household rate of saving. Because pension wealth is likely to be 
endogenous with respect to saving, we instrument pension wealth using an 
interaction indicator for whether a household head belongs to a cohort affected 
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by the reform and whether the household is observed after the reform. 
Instrumenting in this way allows us to purge variation in pension wealth due to 
unobserved differences among households in tastes for saving, and hence to 
identify an exogenous source of variation in pension wealth.  
The quasi-experimental variation in pension wealth is useful because the 
substitutability between private saving and public pension wealth is 
theoretically ambiguous. The canonical life-cycle model predicts perfect 
substitution between private saving and pension wealth; however, Feldstein 
(1974) suggests that, if pension systems induce people to retire earlier and 
extend the period during which they consume out of accumulated assets, a 
public pension system could in fact increase private saving. It seems safe to 
conclude that the illiquid nature of public pension wealth complicates any 
sharp theoretical predictions about its relationship with private saving.  
The empirical literature on substitution between public pension wealth and 
private saving has also been inconclusive. Feldstein (1974) finds that an 
additional $1.00 of Social Security wealth depresses private saving by up to 
$0.50—a degree of substitution between private saving and Social Security 
wealth of 0.5. Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Bernheim (1987), and Alessie, 
Kapteyn, and Klijn (1997) also find a high degree of substitution, typically 0.5 
or more. Other research finds less substitution (King and Dicks-Mireaux 1982; 
Hubbard 1986; Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder 2012), while Pozo and 
Woodbury (1986) find evidence that Social Security increases private saving.1 
Early differences over the estimated degree of substitution between private 
saving and public pensions were due largely to different empirical strategies, 
but recent papers have found varying degrees of substitution despite similar 
                                                 
1 In addition to the debate over substitution between public pensions and 
private saving, a related literature estimates whether private household saving 
is reduced by private pensions (e.g. Cagan 1965; Katona 1965; Munnell 1976; 
Engelhardt and Kumar 2011; Yang 2014) and by tax-deferred pension 
accounts (e.g. Venti and Wise 1990; Gale and Scholz 1994; Chetty et al. 
2014). Bernheim (2002) and Gale (2005) review this literature.  
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approaches to identification. A key difficulty lies in how to account for 
unobserved traits that influence both saving decisions and public pension 
wealth (see Gale (1998) for a discussion of other econometric biases in this 
literature). Much of the recent literature has searched for exogenous shifts in 
public pension wealth as a source of identification. Attanasio and Brugiavini 
(2003), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula 
(2006), Aguila (2011), Banerjee (2011), and Feng, He, and Sato (2011) use 
differential impacts across groups and time created by pension reform as a 
source of variation in pension wealth and apply variants of the difference-in-
differences approach. However, whereas the first four papers find a degree of 
substitution ranging between 0.50 and 0.75, Feng, He, and Sato (2011) report a 
modest relationship of less than 0.20. (Table 7, later in the paper, summarizes 
the findings of these studies.) Finally, an influential paper by Chetty et al. 
(2014) uses detailed administrative data to study the effects of introducing 
government-mandated automatic pension contributions in Denmark and finds 
evidence of no substitution between private saving and public pensions.  
Thus, despite relying on convincing identification strategies, the empirical 
literature remains divided about the degree of substitution between public 
pensions and private saving. It is therefore important to complement the 
existing literature with analysis from other settings and different institutional 
arrangements.  
The main results reported here show that 1 Polish zloty (PLN) less of 
public pension wealth increases household saving by about 0.3 PLN, on 
average—that is, the degree of substitution between public pension wealth and 
private saving is estimated to equal about 0.3. The degree of substitution is 
less for less-educated households than for those with college education (for 
whom public pension wealth and private saving appear to be close substitutes). 
We present several sensitivity checks, in which we vary assumptions about 
households’ subjective discount rate and projections of future earnings and 
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pension wealth, and use somewhat different samples. The results are robust to 
these checks.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides 
background on Poland’s public pension system in the years before and after 
the reform. Section II describes the data and variables from the Polish 
Household Budget Surveys and discusses the empirical strategy used in the 
analysis. Section III describes the results and Section IV discusses the findings 
and concludes. We relegate detailed variable definitions and the discussion of 
criteria used to construct the analysis sample to Online Appendices A and B.  
I. Poland’s 1999 pension reform  
A. Overview2 
In the early 1990s, Poland had a relatively generous public pension system 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. However, the combination of use of early 
retirement options, increased life expectancy, and low fertility raised questions 
about the system’s fiscal long-term solvency. In order to help finance the 
system, the contribution rate was successively raised in the early 1990s, but it 
soon became apparent that these increases provided only a temporary solution 
and that Poland’s public pension system needed a major reform. The initial 
steps toward reform were formulated in 1994, and in the following years 
negotiations were held regarding the choice of a funding system and transition 
rules.  
Following the initial phase, the plan to reform the pension system 
accelerated in the fall of 1997. Although it was expected that a pension reform 
would take place in some form, the details of who would be affected and to 
what extent were still a matter of uncertainty in 1998. The final details were 
approved in October 1998, and the new pension system took effect on January 
                                                 
2 This section is based on Chłoń-Domińczak (2002), who provides a detailed 
description of Poland’s pension system and the events leading up to the 
reform. 
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1, 1999. As Chłoń-Domińczak (2002) points out, an important factor driving 
the haste in reforming the pension system was a supportive public, which 
perceived the old pension arrangements as a carryover from communist days.  
Table 1 highlights the main differences between the pre-reform pension 
system (in Column (1)) and the post-reform pension system (in Column (2)). 
Like many pension reforms, the Polish reform was implemented gradually so 
as to give individuals time to adjust. Column (2) in Table 1 describes the 
features of the post-reform system once it reaches a “steady state.”  
[Table 1 about here] 
B. Impact of the reform across cohorts 
The gradual implementation of the reform affected individuals differently 
depending on their year of birth, which allows us to study the impact of the 
reform by comparing a cohort unaffected directly by the reform with a 
“treated” cohort affected by the reform.  
We define the comparison group as consisting of households whose head 
was born between 1939 and 1948 and thus was older than 50 years at the time 
of the reform (and hence unaffected by the reform). The treated group consists 
of households whose head was born between 1949 and 1958 and thus was 50 
years old or younger at the time of the reform. Hence, the comparison and 
treatment groups consist of households whose head was born within 10 years 
before or 10 years after January 1, 1949, the date separating the groups. Later 
in the paper, we conduct a robustness check in which we limit the estimation 
sample to only include those born between 1944 and 1953—i.e., within five 
years before or five years after 1949.  
Figure 1 shows how the treated group was affected by the reform. It plots 
the average household gross replacement rate by birth year of the household 
head. The replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the first gross monthly 
pension benefit to the last preretirement gross monthly earnings. For each birth 
year, the line with the black circles shows the replacement rate according to 
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the post-reform legislation. Hence, those born prior to 1949 were not directly 
affected by the reform and could expect a gross replacement rate of about 60 
percent both before and after the reform. However, those born in 1949 or later 
will receive a less generous pension and hence have a lower replacement rate.3  
[Figure 1 about here] 
For example, those born in 1957 are affected by the reform and can expect 
to receive a gross replacement rate equal to 40 percent. The line with the 
hollow circles denotes the counterfactual average replacement rate had the pre-
reform system continued unchanged. In this counterfactual world (without the 
pension reform), those born in 1957 would expect to have a gross replacement 
rate equal to about 60 percent. Hence, those born in 1957 experienced a drop 
of about 20 percentage points in their expected replacement rate. By any 
standard, this is a large reduction.  
II. Data and Methods 
A. Data  
The data we use come from the Polish Household Budget Surveys (Badanie 
Budżetów Gospodarstw Domowych, or BBGD), collected by the Polish 
Central Statistical Office (see Barlik and Siwiak (2011)). The BBGD is a 
monthly survey of household income and expenditure; it also includes detailed 
demographic and labor market information (e.g., earnings, occupation, and 
industry). Each month, about 3,100 households are interviewed, or about 
37,500 households annually (about 0.3 percent of Poland’s population). 
Demographics, labor market information, and most sources of income are 
collected at the individual level, while expenditure and housing information is 
reported at the household level. We use data for the years 1997–2003, which 
                                                 
3 All calculations in Figure 1 hold the retirement age the same for both 
scenarios; see Online Appendix A for details. The percentage-point drop 
reported in the figure corresponds closely to the net replacement rate drop 
reported in chart 8 of Chłoń-Domińczak (2002, 128).  
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allows us to observe five years after the implementation of the 1999 reform. 
The main analysis sample consists of households whose head was born 
between 1939 and 1958. The data include a small longitudinal component. 
Overall, 70 percent of our estimation sample is observed only once and we 
therefore treat the data as repeated cross-sections. We cluster the standard 
errors at the household level to account for the correlation of the residuals for 
the households that appear more than once in the sample.  
Following the literature (e.g., Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003; Attanasio 
and Rohwedder 2003; Aguila 2011), we construct the household saving rate as 
a household’s available income minus total household expenditure divided by 
household available income. (Household available income is defined as gross 
income minus real estate taxes.)  
The pension wealth variable is constructed in three steps (described in 
detail in Online Appendix A). First, we estimate lifetime earnings profiles for 
each household head (and for the spouse if present). Second, pension wealth is 
computed using pension regulations in force in the year the household is 
observed. (Online Appendix A details the assumptions made in computing 
pension wealth.) Third, we define “expected pension wealth” as the 
household’s present value of the sum of benefits, adjusted by survival 
probabilities obtained from the Polish life tables (see Brugiavini, Maser, and 
Sundén (2005) for a discussion of approaches to estimating pension wealth).  
There are clearly other approaches to estimating the level of pension 
wealth, and in the results section, we conduct several robustness checks. 
However, because our analysis focuses on the relationship between pension 
wealth and private saving at the margin, the method of modeling the level of 
pension wealth should be less important than correctly measuring the changes 
in pension wealth (Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003).  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. For 
expenditure, the saving rate, earnings, and pension wealth (divided by 
earnings), we report sample means, standard deviations, and median values. 
9 
 
For the other variables, we report means and (for continuous variables) 
standard deviations. The median saving rate is about 9 percent and the average 
saving rate is about 2 percent. The average age of the household head is about 
48 years (“treated” household heads are on average 46 years old and 
“comparison” household heads are on average 54 years old).  
[Table 2 about here] 
B. Consequences of the reform: identifying effects using 
difference-in-differences 
We begin our analysis of the effects of the 1999 reform by comparing the 
mean outcomes of the comparison and treated groups. To do so, we estimate 
multiyear difference-in-differences (DD) regressions of the following form:  
(1)  𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 ×𝑗 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) + 𝐱𝑖𝑡𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  
 where SR is the saving rate of household i in year t, Year denotes year 
dummies (j = 1997, 1999, …., 2003 and so year 1998 is the omitted category), 
Treated is a dummy that equals 1 if the household head belongs to the cohort 
directly affected by the reform (those born between 1949 and 1958) and 0 
otherwise (those born between 1939 and 1948, are the omitted category), 
Year×Treated denotes interactions between the year dummies and the treated-
group dummy, and  is the regression error term. Finally, because about 30 
percent of households appear in the estimation sample more than once, we 
cluster the standard errors by household.4  
The estimated δs are the reduced-form, regression-adjusted differences in 
saving rates of the treated group, relative to the comparison group and holding 
pre-reform differences between the treated and comparison groups constant.  
                                                 
4 We have also estimated models where we cluster standard errors by year of 
birth. Our results remain statistically significant, but our preferred approach is 
to cluster on the household level as clustering by year of birth, effectively 
leaves us with only 20 clusters.  
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To increase the precision of the estimates, we include a vector of controls, 
denoted by x, that includes an intercept, month-of-year dummies, a quadratic 
polynomial in age, gender, number of persons in the household (household 
size), number of children, marital status, education dummies, occupation 
dummies, a dummy for working in the private sector, and a dummy for 
whether the household owns the house it lives in (i.e., place of residence). We 
do not include estimated lifetime earnings on the right-hand side of Equation 
(1), as lifetime earnings may have been affected by the reform. Instead, we use 
education and occupation indicators, which were largely determined before the 
reform. The analysis is conducted at the household level. All control variables 
reflect the characteristics of the household head, except for household size, 
number of children, and a dummy for whether the household owns the house it 
lives in, as those variables are household characteristics.  
In addition to using the saving rate as the outcome variable, we also 
estimate Equation (1) using the log of household expenditure as the outcome. 
We view the log expenditure regression as a robustness check. Specifically, 
finding that the δ-estimates from the log expenditure model are a mirror image 
of the δ-estimates from the saving rate model would imply that the effect of 
pension reform on the measured saving rate (available income minus 
expenditure, divided by available income) results from pension reform’s effect 
on expenditure rather than on available income.  
The data cover the years 1997–2003. Using two years of data prior to the 
reform, 1997 and 1998, allows us to test for pre-existing group-by-time trends. 
The presence of pre-reform differences in outcomes between the comparison 
and treatment groups would call into question whether the differences 
observed after the reform can be interpreted as its consequences. Using five 
years of data after the reform, 1999–2003, allows us to examine whether the 
response to the reform was delayed.  
11 
 
C. Consequences of the reform: estimating the degree of 
substitution between public pensions and private saving  
While the DD estimator presented in Equation (1) has the advantage of being 
transparent, it is not directly informative of the degree of substitution between 
public pension wealth and private saving. In particular, we need to estimate 
how changes in expected pension wealth affect the saving rate. This subsection 
discusses the instrumental variable (IV) estimator we use to identify the degree 
of substitution. We then describe an additional adjustment to the pension 
wealth variable, Gale’s Q adjustment (Gale 1998), which corrects the bias 
occurring due to observing households with varying planning horizons.  
IV estimator 
The model of interest can be written as follows:  
(2) 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼1,𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝐱𝑖𝑡𝛄1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where SR is the saving rate of household i in year t, PW is expected household 
pension wealth divided by current gross household earnings, Year denotes 
year dummies (j = 1997, 1999, …., 2003, with 1998 as the omitted category), 
Treated is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head belongs to the cohort 
directly affected by the reform (0 otherwise), x is a vector of controls 
described in Section II.B, and e is an error term.  
 The coefficient of main interest is the substitution parameter θ, which 
gives the change in the saving rate in response to a change in public pension 
wealth as a proportion of current gross household earnings. We define the 
degree of substitution as the absolute value of θ: if a decrease in PW increases 
household saving, we would expect θ to lie between −1 (complete 
substitution) and 0 (no substitution).  
 OLS estimates of Equation (2) will be inconsistent for θ if PW and e are 
correlated. For example, some individuals may have an unobserved “taste for 
saving” that leads them both to save more and to have higher pension wealth. 
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If so, then the OLS estimator of θ will be positively biased, although precision 
will not necessarily be affected. Also, pension wealth may be measured with 
error. If so, under the classical error-in-variables assumption, the OLS 
estimator of θ will be attenuated and imprecise (although θ should have the 
correct sign).5  
 To correct these potential sources of bias, we make use of two 
institutional features of the 1999 pension reform described above. First, the 
1999 pension reform shifted the expected level of PW for some households but 
not for others. Second, this shift depended only on predetermined factors, 
namely individuals’ year of birth. It follows that a valid instrumental variable 
for PW will be the interaction term between (i) Post-reform — a dummy equal 
to 1 if the household head is observed in 1999 or later (0 otherwise) and (ii) 
Treated — the indicator for whether the household head belongs to a cohort 
directly affected by the reform, as already described. (Meyer (1995, 159) 
discusses combining IV and DD methods.)  
 This leads to the following first-stage equation for the determination of 
pension wealth: 
(3) 𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝜅0(𝑃ost-reform × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜅1,𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑗 + 𝜅2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝐱𝑖𝑡𝛄2 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡, 
where the interaction term, Post-reform×Treated, is the IV for PW. Because it 
varies only due to the reform, this IV is unlikely to be correlated with the error 
term in Equation (2). The exclusion restriction is that the reform affected the 
saving rate only through its effect on PW. Given these assumptions, the 
estimate of θ is the estimated effect of pension wealth on the saving rate, 
identified through the differential impact of the reform on the treated and 
comparison groups. Furthermore, this IV is relevant as it is highly correlated 
with PW (the first-stage regression F-test statistic exceeds 100). (In estimating 
                                                 
5 Alessie, Angelini, and van Santen (2013) discuss problems with 
measurement error in pension wealth.  
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the IV model, as with the DD estimator, we cluster the standard errors by 
household.)  
As with the DD estimator (Equation (1)), we also use the log of household 
expenditure as an outcome in Equation (2). In the IV case, the change in log 
expenditure is estimated as a response to a change in pension wealth 
(proportional to current gross household earnings). By analogy to the DD 
estimator, we expect the θ-estimates from the log expenditure model and 
saving rate model to be mirror images.  
Accounting for differences in the planning horizon 
Gale (1998; 2005) shows that estimates of substitution from a cross-sectional 
regression of saving in year t on pension wealth in year t—i.e. the present 
value of a stream of benefits occurring in the future—will be biased toward 0. 
Specifically, in the case of complete substitution (θ = −1), the cross-sectional 
estimate of θ will equal −Q, where 0 < Q < 1. This attenuation occurs because 
the θ-estimate will reflect a one-time increase in saving (i.e., in year t) 
following a decrease in pension wealth rather than an increase in saving over 
the full planning horizon. As a remedy, Gale (1998) proposes an adjustment 
factor, known in the literature as Gale’s Q, which is a function of the 
subjective discount rate, the point in the life cycle at which an individual is 
observed, and the point in the life cycle when the individual (re)optimizes her 
saving—e.g., after a change in expected pension wealth.  
To see how this factor can be derived, consider the following simple 
discrete-time model adapted from Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and 
generalized in Feng, He, and Sato (2011). Suppose an individual lives T 
periods. From period t = s until t = TR−1, she works and receives exogenously 
determined income y, and from period t = TR until t = T, she is retired and 
receives pension benefits, p. In each period, she has to decide how much to 
consume and how much to save for the future. The problem can be expressed 
as 
14 
 
(4) max
𝑐𝑡
∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝑠𝑢(𝑐𝑡)  s. t.  ∑
𝑐𝑡
𝑅𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑡=𝑠 ≤ ∑
𝑦𝑡
𝑅𝑡−𝑠
𝑇𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑠 + ∑
𝑝𝑡
𝑅𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇𝑅
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 
where c denotes consumption, R = (1+r) with r representing the real interest 
rate, and β is the subjective discount factor. 
Suppose that, as in Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), u(c) = log(c). 
Without loss of generality and to simplify the notation, assume that R = 1. 
Consumption for any period t, as seen from period s, can then be expressed as 
(5) 𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽
𝑡−𝑠𝑐𝑠, where 𝑐𝑠 = (
1−𝛽
1−𝛽𝑇−𝑠+1
) [∑ 𝑦𝑡 + ∑ 𝑝𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇𝑅
𝑇𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑠 ],  
which implies that the saving rate in any period t, as seen from period s, can be 
expressed as 
(6) 𝑆𝑅𝑡 ≡  
𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡
𝑦𝑡
= 1 − 𝛽𝑡−𝑠 (
1−𝛽
1−𝛽𝑇−𝑠+1
) [
∑ 𝑦𝑡+∑ 𝑝𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇𝑅
𝑇𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑠
𝑦𝑡
]. 
Gale (1998) shows that if one estimates Equation (6) by regressing the 
saving rate on pension wealth, in the scenario where the true degree of 
substitution is complete, the coefficient on pension wealth will not equal −1, 
but rather −Q, where  
(7)  𝑄 = 𝛽𝑡−𝑠 (
1−𝛽
1−𝛽𝑇−𝑠+1
). 
Gale shows that, in principle, one can recover the unbiased estimate of 
substitution by dividing the substitution estimate by Q or by multiplying each 
household’s pension wealth by Q.6 The additional information needed includes 
an assumed value for β, as well as specifying s—the point in time when the 
household made its consumption plan—and (T−s)—the remaining planning 
horizon for each household whose head is t years old in the data.  
Equation (6) describes the optimal saving rate for each period t as seen 
from period s. However, if an unexpected shock to pension wealth occurs at 
                                                 
6 Gale (1998) also shows that even if the true degree of substitution is less than 
complete, a regression of the saving rate on pension wealth will understate the 
true degree of substitution by a factor of Q.  
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some later period—e.g., at the end of period τ−1—then, from period τ onward, 
the household would behave according to a reoptimized consumption plan, 
given the level of assets carried over from the previous period. Therefore, for 
households experiencing a shock to pension wealth, the appropriate 
adjustment factor for any period t ≥ τ is  
(8) 𝑄∗ =  𝛽𝑡−𝜏 (
1−𝛽
1−𝛽𝑇−𝜏+1
) , 
which takes into account the shorter remaining planning horizon.  
In practice, for households affected by the reform, we apply the Q* 
adjustment, setting τ equal to the age of the head of household when the 1999 
pension reform occurred and setting t equal to the current age of the household 
head. T−τ is set to equal the head’s remaining life expectancy after the reform. 
For households unaffected by the reform, we apply the Q adjustment factor, 
setting t equal to the current age of the household head and setting s equal to 
the age when the head last reoptimized her optimal consumption plan. We 
assume this to be the time of the collapse of the People’s Republic of Poland 
in 1989, an event that changed the economic environment in Poland (although 
it did not affect pensions directly). T−s is set to be equal to the remaining life 
expectancy of the household head. For both Q and Q*, we follow Attanasio 
and Brugiavini (2003) and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and assume that β 
equals 0.98. We examine this assumption in more detail in our sensitivity 
analysis in Section III.D.  
D. Validity of the estimates 
Internal validity of our estimates depends on a number of factors. First, the 
substitution estimate would be attenuated if the pension reform were 
anticipated before 1999, leading households to adjust their behavior in 
advance. Second, because our identifying variation stems from comparing 
households from various cohorts over time, internal validity depends on the 
degree of comparability of the treated and comparison groups. Third, if the 
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groups studied differed in unobserved ways before and after the reform (e.g., if 
unobserved factors affected the difference in trends between cohorts), the 
Post-reform×Treated dummy and the regression error term would be 
correlated. Fourth, internal validity would be compromised if other factors 
confounded the effect of the reform.  
A number of factors arguably strengthen the internal validity of the 
analysis. First, the particulars of who would and would not be affected by the 
1999 pension reform were not decided upon before October 1998. In 
consequence, the treated group had little time to adjust their behavior before 
the reform. In Section III.D, we conduct a robustness check where we drop 
households observed between October and December 1998, to exclude those 
who may have reacted to the legislated changes before they came into force on 
1 January 1999. These estimates are similar to the main estimates.  
Second, the comparison and treated cohorts are observed in our data at 
slightly different stages of their lives, which might result in unobserved 
heterogeneity across the cohorts before and after the reform that could be due 
to different age patterns of saving. However, the cohorts are, arguably 
sufficiently close in age for their patterns of saving to be very similar absent 
the reform. We also condition the estimates on age polynomials and other 
demographics. In Section III.D, we conduct robustness checks in which we 
narrow the age span between cohorts still further. Our estimates turn out to be 
robust to these different assumptions.  
Third, in order to correct for measurement error in pension wealth using 
our IV approach, the Post-reform×Treated dummy cannot be correlated with 
measurement error in pension wealth. Because measurement error in pension 
wealth is likely to be of greater concern the more different in age the treated 
and comparison groups are over time, we focus our analysis on a relatively 
narrow age span.  
Fourth, Poland was undergoing other reforms at the time of the pension 
reform. Hence, one may wonder whether our estimates are confounded by the 
17 
 
effects of these other reforms. To our knowledge, though, no reform or other 
change during the period 1999−2003 (the post-reform observation period) 
affected people who were born in 1949 or later in a different way from people 
born before 1949.  
Finally, we believe that because the 1999 pension reform was a large, 
nationwide reform, and because its implementation resembles a natural 
experiment, estimates based on the reform should provide generalizable 
insights for retirement policy in other contexts.  
III. Results 
A. Difference-in-differences estimates 
Figure 2 plots the values of the average saving rate for the comparison group 
(dashed line) and the treated group (solid line) between 1997 and 2003. 
Between 1997 and 1998, the saving rates of both the treated and comparison 
groups declined in parallel, supporting the common trends assumption needed 
to identify the effect of the reform. However, starting in 1999, the saving rate 
of the treated group recovered from its 1998 low, whereas the saving rate of 
the comparison group continued to fall. The falling saving rate of the 
comparison group and the comparatively steady saving rate of the treated 
group suggest that the saving rate of the treated group after the reform 
increased relative to the comparison group and relative to before the reform.  
In order to interpret this relative increase as a causal effect of the reform, 
we need to be able to interpret the time-profile of the saving rate of the 
comparison group as a valid counterfactual. Available evidence suggests that 
during 1997–2003 the overall aggregate voluntary household saving rate in 
Poland (calculated in relation to gross domestic product) declined in a pattern 
similar to that experienced by the comparison group in Figure 2. Specifically, 
the aggregate voluntary household saving rate fell from about 10 percent in 
1997 to about 5 percent in 2003 (2014 World Bank Report on Poland, figure 
2.11, page 15). That the aggregate voluntary saving rate and the saving rate of 
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the comparison group both fell during the period in question tends to support 
the identifying assumption—in the absence of the pension reform, the saving 
rates of the treated and comparison groups would have fallen in parallel.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 complements Figure 2 by showing regression-adjusted differences 
between the treated and comparison groups for the saving rate (top panel) and 
for log expenditure (bottom panel). (These are estimates of δs from Equation 
(1), so the outcomes of the treated group are shown relative to the comparison 
group and relative to the pre-reform year 1998, which allows us to examine 
potential pre-reform group-by-time trends.) The point estimates are presented 
for 1997–2003 with 95 percent confidence intervals (the whiskers).  
[Figure 3 about here] 
The absence of statistically significant differences between the treated and 
comparison groups in the pre-reform year 1997 lends further support to the 
common trends assumption required to interpret the point estimates for 1999–
2003 as effects of the reform (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 237–41). The relative 
changes after 1999 show that the saving rate tended to increase over time (and 
log expenditure tended to decrease) for the treated group in the post-reform 
years, although the estimates are somewhat imprecise in 2000.7  
In summary, Figure 3 suggests that the estimated effects on the saving rate 
in the post-reform years are positive and lie between 0 and 5 percentage 
points. This finding suggests that the reduction in pension benefit generosity 
due to the reform led to an increase in the rate of saving and a decrease in 
expenditures. Although the DD estimates suggest a causal link between the 
                                                 
7 In Figure B.1 in Online Appendix B, we test for pre-existing group-by-time 
trends by using the 1995 and 1996 waves of the BBGD. Unfortunately, these 
two waves do not have information on occupation, a key variable in the 
definition of our sample and calculation of pension wealth, so we are unable to 
use these waves in our main analysis. Nevertheless, Figure B.1 tends to 
confirm the lack of significant differences in pre-reform saving and 
expenditure patterns between the treated and comparison groups.  
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pension reform and saving behavior of households, they are not directly 
informative about the degree of substitution. To estimate the latter, we turn to 
the IV estimates of the model in Equations (2) and (3).  
B. Estimated effects of pension wealth on the saving rate and 
expenditure 
The left column of Table 3 shows the estimates of substitution (θ) from 
Equation (2) using the saving rate as the dependent variable. The right column 
of Table 3 shows the estimated effect of pension wealth on expenditure from 
Equation (2). Panel A shows the estimates obtained using OLS without 
instrumenting PW by Post-reform×Treated and where PW is not adjusted by 
the Q-factor. Panel B shows the estimates obtained using IV where PW is 
instrumented by Post-reform×Treated but where PW is not adjusted by the Q-
factor. Panel C shows the estimates obtained using IV where PW is 
instrumented by Post-reform×Treated and where PW is adjusted by the Q-
factor. We do not report coefficients on other right-hand-side variables.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The OLS estimates of substitution (θ) presented in Panel A of Table 3 are 
very close to 0, possibly because of measurement error in the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, when using log expenditure as an outcome, the OLS 
point estimate has an unexpected negative sign, implying that a decrease in 
pension wealth increases household expenditures. The two IV estimates in 
Panel B are also small, but both have the expected sign: negative for the 
saving rate and positive for log expenditure. In the case of log expenditure as 
an outcome, the difference in sign between the OLS estimate in Panel A and 
the IV estimate in Panel B is consistent with the OLS estimator being biased 
because of unobserved heterogeneity, a result also found by Attanasio and 
Rohwedder (2003) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011).  
The estimates of main interest are in Panel C, using IV with Q-adjusted 
pension wealth. These estimates have the expected signs and are larger in 
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absolute terms than the estimates in Panel B. This is because in Panel C each 
household’s pension wealth is multiplied by the Q-factor and, while 
multiplying pension wealth by Q does not change the sign of the estimate of 
substitution, it does rescale the estimate. Hence, the estimates in Panel C 
suggest that a 1 PLN decrease in pension wealth increases private saving by 
about 0.29 PLN and decreases spending by about 0.34 PLN.8   
The change in magnitude between the IV estimates in Panel B and C is 
comparable to the change reported by Feng, He, and Sato (2009), where the 
substitution estimate obtained using unadjusted pension wealth equaled –
0.014, while the substitution estimate obtained using Q-adjusted pension 
wealth equaled –0.257.  
The estimates presented in Table 3, Panel C, as in most recent studies of 
public pension substitution, differ from those of Chetty et al. (2014), who find 
that in Denmark the relationship between private saving and public pensions is 
zero. The reason could be as simple as differences in cultural norms with 
regard to saving between Denmark and countries such as Poland, Italy, or the 
United Kingdom.9 Another possible reason is that while our analysis—as well 
as that of Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), 
and Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula (2006)—identifies substitution in the 
context of reforms that reduced pension wealth, Chetty et al. (2014) examine a 
setting that increased pension wealth. Similarly, Feng, He, and Sato (2011) 
                                                 
8 When using ten separate dummies for each of the year-of-birth cohorts 
affected by the reform interacted with Post-reform, and controlling for year 
dummies and year-of-birth cohort dummies, we obtain somewhat smaller 
effects: θ = –0.175 (standard error = 0.11) for the saving rate and θ = 0.131 
(standard error = 0.10) for log expenditure.  
9 For example, using comparable cross-country data from the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), Alessie, Angelini, and 
van Santen (2013) study public pensions and saving in different regions of 
Europe. However, contrary to both Chetty et al. (2014) and evidence from the 
Italian pension reforms (Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003; Bottazzi, Jappelli, and 
Padula 2006), they find that substitution is largest in Northern European 
countries and smallest in Southern (and Eastern) European countries.  
21 
 
study the effects of introducing a pension system and find a low degree of 
substitution. Hence, although standard expected utility theory predicts that the 
saving response should be symmetrical with respect to increases and decreases 
in pension wealth, the response of private saving may in fact depend on the 
direction of change in pension wealth.10  
Differences between Chetty et al. (2014) and other studies could also result 
from differences in the degree of awareness of the respective reforms. As with 
the Italian reform, the debate about Poland’s 1999 pension reform was highly 
visible in the media, which could be reflected in a relatively large observed 
response. Finally, whereas Chetty et al. use a regression-discontinuity design 
to identify the effect of mandated saving for individuals close to the 
discontinuity, we use variation resulting from a broad-based reform to identify 
the degree of substitution across an entire population. 
C. Analysis of subsamples  
Previous research on financial literacy has found that households may not 
fully understand the details of how public pension systems work (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2014). One might speculate that better-educated individuals are better 
informed about pension systems in general, are more likely to be “active” 
savers (Chetty et al. 2014), or are financially more able to adjust their savings. 
If so, we would expect a larger degree of substitution for better-educated 
households. For example, using three Italian reforms (in 1992, 1995, and 
1997), Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula (2006) find the degree of substitution to 
be about 0.8 among individuals who are well informed about the pension 
system. Gale (1998) also finds substitution close to 0.7 for highly-educated 
households in the United States (compared with 0.5 in the full sample).  
                                                 
10 This asymmetry could be understood in the context of prospect theory, 
which highlights the importance of reference points and holds that individuals 
react more strongly to losses than to corresponding gains.  
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The accumulated value of assets other than pension wealth might also 
influence the sensitivity to changes in pension wealth. In theory, we would 
expect households that have accumulated a buffer stock to be less sensitive to 
pension wealth changes than those without assets. Since the BBGD does not 
collect information on financial assets, we split the sample by house-
ownership status, treating house ownership as an indicator for housing wealth.  
Table 4 presents IV estimates for different subsamples: in the top panel, 
we split households by the head’s level of education, while in the bottom panel 
we split households by house-ownership status. For households where the 
head has at least tertiary (that is, university) education, the point estimates 
suggest complete substitution. For households with less-educated heads, the 
estimated substitution is less than one-third.  
[Table 4 about here] 
We find little difference between the substitution estimates of households 
that own and do not own a house. This finding is puzzling because it suggests 
that Polish households ignore their housing wealth when making decisions 
about saving. A possible explanation is that Polish households treat their 
housing assets as a key element of their future bequest. For example, there is 
very little evidence of household downsizing in Poland as individuals age and 
become widowed. In such a scenario, housing represents a very illiquid asset, 
limiting the extent to which the household would be willing to substitute 
between discretionary saving, pension wealth, and housing wealth.  
Another reason for the lack of difference by house ownership, might be a 
limited ability to borrow against housing equity (e.g., in the form of home 
equity loans). Angelini, Brugiavini, and Weber (2011) find a clear negative 
correlation between measures of mortgage market development, such as loan-
to-value ratios, and the share of elderly homeowners who report difficulties 
making ends meet (an indicator of financial distress). Using data from the 
2006–07 wave of the SHARE survey, they show that in Poland about 70 
percent of elderly homeowners reported financial distress, the highest value in 
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their sample of thirteen European countries. At the same time, the authors 
report that between 2003 and 2006, the typical loan-to-value ratio in Poland 
was about 50 percent, the second lowest value in their sample. Hence, 
although elderly homeowners in Poland at this time were likely to own their 
homes outright, they were also likely to report a high degree of financial 
distress, and this financial distress appears to be correlated with a low level of 
development of the market for home equity. Although we do not have direct 
evidence, we speculate that low levels of development of the mortgage market 
can be viewed as a proxy for the absence of financial instruments allowing 
homeowners to borrow against housing equity.  
D. Robustness analysis  
In this section, we conduct four robustness checks by changing the definitions 
of the analysis sample, one robustness check where we alter the computation 
of pension wealth, and a robustness check where we change the assumptions 
regarding the Q-factor.  
Redefining the analysis sample  
The main estimation sample consists of 8,854 households in the comparison 
group and 28,550 households in the treated group (see Table 2), so we begin 
our sensitivity analysis by examining the role of this imbalance by randomly 
selecting 8,854 households from the treated group. The IV estimates are given 
in Panel A of Table 5, and the degree of substitution estimated is similar in 
magnitude and precision to the main results in Panel C of Table 3.  
[Table 5 about here] 
In Panel B of Table 5, we restrict the analysis sample to cohorts whose 
birth year is closer to 1949, in order to limit potential unobserved 
heterogeneity between the comparison and treated groups. We select 
household heads born between 1944 and 1948 for the comparison group and 
household heads born between 1949 and 1953 for the treated group. The 
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estimates in this sample are close to the main estimates in Table 3—about –
0.39 for the saving rate and 0.23 for log expenditure.  
The BBGD expenditure categories were redefined starting in 1998, so in 
Panel C of Table 5 we re-estimate the model after excluding the data from the 
1997 survey. By using this smaller sample, the point estimates are somewhat 
smaller in absolute terms than in the main specification—about –0.22 for the 
saving rate and about 0.29 for log expenditure.11  
In the main estimates, we include households headed by men up to age 65 
and women up to age 60. However, these age limits are close to typical 
retirement ages and could include households that are already transitioning to 
retirement. To exclude such households, Panel D restricts the analysis sample 
to households headed by men up to age 60 and women up to age 55. The main 
results are robust to this restriction as well.  
Different assumptions about pension wealth calculation 
In Panel E of Table 5, we recalculate pension wealth by assuming retirement 
occurs at 55 for men and 50 for women, instead of 65 for men and 60 for 
women as with the main estimates. The resulting point estimates are larger in 
absolute value—about –0.43 for the saving rate and 0.50 for log expenditure. 
This higher degree of substitution makes sense, as the calculation shortens the 
contribution period of the cohorts affected by the reform.12 
                                                 
11 We also re-estimated the model excluding observations for 
October−December 1998 as well as the year 1997. Recall that the reform bill 
was passed in October 1998, so a sizable share of pre-reform observations are 
observed in the last months of 1998. If these households had reacted to the 
reform before January 1999, we would expect to see a slightly lower degree of 
substitution. For this sample, we obtain θ = –0.24 (standard error = 0.11) for 
the saving rate and θ = 0.29 (standard error = 0.11) for log expenditure.   
12 We also re-estimated the model with female spouse’s lifetime earnings 
estimated using OLS rather than a selection model. The estimates are similar, 
although larger than the baseline estimates in Table 3, Panel C.  
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Sensitivity to different values of the subjective discount factor  
Section III.B showed that the estimated substitution effects depend on whether 
the value of pension wealth is adjusted by the Q-factor. This factor in turn 
depends on the choice of the subjective discount factor, β. Typically, β has 
been set between 0.96 and 0.98, but there is no clear consensus as to what 
value it should take.13 In this subsection, we check the sensitivity of the 
substitution estimates to different assumptions about β.  
Table 6 maps selected values of β to the values of the Q-factor and to the 
estimates of substitution using the saving rate as the outcome. For each value 
of β listed in Column (1), Column (2) shows the corresponding mean value of 
Q in our sample, its minimum value, and its maximum value. Column (3) 
shows the resulting IV estimate of substitution from the regression that uses 
the same specification as our main estimates (Table 3, Panel C) as a function 
of β (and, hence, a function of Q).  
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 shows that for the selected range of β, the Q-factor decreases as the 
subjective discount factor β increases, so that, holding other factors equal, 
large values of Q (low values of β), imply smaller estimates of substitution 
than do small values of Q (high values of β). For example, for β equal to 0.90, 
the substitution estimate is about –0.08, while for β equal to 0.999, the 
estimate is about –0.42. In the range of the most popular choices of β used in 
the literature—between 0.96 and 0.98—we obtain substitution estimates in a 
relatively narrow range—between about –0.20 and –0.29. Still, the sensitivity 
of estimates to the choice of the discount factor is an important result to note.  
                                                 
13 Aguila (2011) assumes it to be 0.90, Gale (1998) assumes it to equal 0.96, 
Alessie, Angelini, and van Santen (2013) set it to 0.97, and Attanasio and 
Brugiavini (2003), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), Bottazzi, Jappelli, and 
Padula (2006), and Feng, He, and Sato (2011) assume it to be 0.98; see also 
Table 7.  
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IV. Discussion and conclusion  
We have studied the large change in expected pension wealth induced by 
Poland’s 1999 pension reform to estimate the effect of public pensions on 
private household saving. Implementation of the reform created quasi-
experimental variation in pension wealth suitable for investigating whether 
households increase private saving in response to reduced generosity of a 
public pension plan.  
The difference-in-differences estimates displayed in Figure 3 show the 
reform increased household saving and decreased expenditure. The main IV 
estimates in Panel C of Table 3 suggest that, overall, public pensions increase 
private saving by about 0.3 PLN for each 1.0 PLN decrease of pension wealth. 
This is a sizable degree of substitution, although it is far from complete. 
Combined with the conclusions of Lindner and Morawski (2012) that the 
reform had little effect on labor supply, the estimates suggest that, when faced 
with a reduction in future pension benefits, older households in Poland choose 
to adjust their saving rather than their labor supply.  
We find that for highly-educated households—those we expect to be 
informed about the reform or who are financially better able to adjust—
substitution between private saving and pension wealth is close to complete. 
We speculate that the more modest response among lower-educated 
households could be due to liquidity constraints, incomplete information, or 
uncertainty about how enduring the 1999 reform would be. The relatively 
passive behavior of less-educated households echoes findings in the literature 
on financial literacy, which suggests that by remaining passive, these 
households risk being inadequately prepared for retirement (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2014). This, in turn may suggest a need for improved financial 
literacy, especially among groups at risk of insufficient retirement resources.  
The main estimate of the degree of substitution of about 0.3 is at the lower 
end of the range of existing estimates. Table 7 summarizes recent studies 
using methods similar to ours, lists the data and sample definitions applied, 
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and, whenever possible, documents the variation in the degree of substitution 
by age. Among the studies that split the analysis by age, substitution tends to 
be higher for people aged roughly 40 to 55 years, an age interval similar to the 
one examined in this paper. (See, for example, Attanasio and Rohwedder 
(2003), where the degree of substitution equals about 0.65 for ages 43−53, and 
Feng, He, and Sato (2011), where it equals about 0.38 for ages 46−59.) In 
comparison, the estimated degree of substitution from the Polish reform is 
relatively small and closest to the estimate for 46−55-year-olds reported by 
Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), about 0.24. Hence, despite using similar 
methods and imposing similar age restrictions for their samples, these papers 
report varying degrees of substitution. A systematic study of the reasons for 
these differences across countries and pension reforms would be highly useful.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Finally, the robustness checks in Table 6 show that the estimates of the 
degree of substitution depend to some extent on assumptions about the 
subjective discount rate. For example, our main estimate of the degree of 
substitution of about 0.3 assumes a discount rate of 2 percent. Assuming 
instead a higher discount rate (4 percent) yields a degree of substitution closer 
to 0.2. This difference could be large enough to carry implications for policy. 
In order for researchers to make recommendations about the impact of public 
pensions on saving, we need to know more about the values of subjective 
discount rates and their distribution in the population. On the whole, we prefer 
to err on the side of caution and interpret our main estimate of the degree of 
substitution as an upper bound.  
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Figure 1: Simulated mean household gross pension replacement rate, by year 
of birth, 1939−58  
 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations using Badanie Budżetów Gospodarstw 
Domowych (BBGD). The replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the first 
monthly gross pension benefit to the last pre-retirement gross monthly 
earnings; see Online Appendix A for details on how pension benefits are 
calculated. The line with the black circles denotes the actual mean replacement 
rate by the household head’s birth year. The line with the hollow circles 
denotes the counterfactual pre-reform mean replacement rate (i.e., the 
replacement rate that would have applied in the absence of the reform) for the 
cohorts affected by the reform by the household head’s birth year. The dashed 
vertical line indicates 1949, the first birth-year cohort affected by the reform.  
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Figure 2: Mean saving rate in the BBGD, by year and group 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations using the BBGD. The saving rate is defined as 
available household income minus total household expenditure, divided by 
available household income. The dashed line indicates the comparison group, 
born 1939–48, and the solid line indicates the treated group, born 1949–58. 
The dashed vertical line indicates the first year of the reform.  
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Figure 3: Estimated effect of the 1999 pension reform on the saving rate and 
log expenditure, by year  
  
Note: The figure shows point estimates from Equation (1) where the outcome 
variable is regressed on six year dummies, a “treated” dummy (if born 1949–
58), treated-by-year interaction terms, and the same controls as listed in the 
notes to Table 3. Each panel shows the treated-by-year interaction point 
estimates (δs) over time. The omitted categories are year 1998 (the year before 
the reform) and the comparison group (if born 1939–48). The figure presents 
95-percent confidence intervals (whiskers) based on standard errors that are 
robust and clustered by household. The dashed vertical line indicates the first 
year of the reform.  
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Table 1: Key features of Poland’s public pension system before and after the 
1999 reform   
(1) 
Pre-reform system 
(2) 
Post-reform system (steady 
state) 
Financing and contributions     
Financing Pay-as-you-go, defined 
benefit  
Pay-as-you-go, notionally 
defined contribution (NDC) 
plan (first tier) and a funded 
defined contribution (FDC) plan 
(second tier). NDC contribution 
is 12.22 percent of salary; FDC 
is 7.3 percenta 
Benefit calculation     
Benefit formula Flat rate plus an earnings-
related component  
Actuarially-adjusted and 
annuity-based on total 
contributions. 
Pension base Average of 10 best years out 
of 20 years prior to retirement  
 
Lifetime earnings 
Minimum years of 
contributions 
20 for women, 25 for men  20 for women, 25 for men  
Minimum (and maximum) 
pension benefit b 
35 percent of average national 
wage (maximum earnings-
related benefit: 250 percent of 
average national wage) 
20 percent of average national 
wage (maximum contribution: 
250 percent of average national 
wage) 
Retirement age     
Normal retirement age Because of early retirement 
options, the effective 
retirement ages: 59 for men, 
55 for women 
65 for men, 60 for women 
Early retirement provision Available for most 
occupations  
Certain groups, women, and 
workers in the public sector still 
have early retirement privileges 
Transition rules  Cohorts born before 1949 
fully covered by the pre-
reform system, including the 
right to retire early as in the 
pre-reform system 
Cohorts born after 1969 fully 
covered by the new system.  
Cohorts born 1949–1968 could 
choose to make only NDC 
contributions.c Separate rules 
for the first five cohorts of 
women affected by the reform 
(born 1949–53) 
Replacement rate at 65 years 
(men) and 60 years (women)d 
65–76 percent for men, 70 
percent for women 
40−60 percent for men, 30–50 
percent for women  
Source: Adapted from Chłoń, Góra, and Rutkowski (1999) and Chłoń-Domińczak (2002)  
a Unisex life tables used in the NDC plan.  
b Maximum benefit is set implicitly by the maximum contribution rate; see Chłoń-Domińczak 
and Strzelecki (2013).  
c Majority chose to participate in the NDC plan; see Chłoń-Domińczak (2002).  
d Replacement rate defined as the ratio of first annual benefit to last annual salary. 
Calculations from Chłoń, Góra, and Rutkowski (1999, 36–7) and Chłoń-Domińczak (2002, 
128). Simulation assumes the statutory retirement age under both regimes: 60 for women, 65 
for men.  
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Dependent variables 
Log expenditure 7.63 0.50 7.62 
Saving rate 0.02 0.47 0.09 
 
Characteristics of household head 
Age  47.75 4.65 
 
Female (percent) 39 
  
Marital status (percent) 
   
Unmarried 4.70 
  
Married 79.74 
  
Widowed 5.95 
  
Divorced or separated 9.61 
  
Educational attainment (percent) 
   
Tertiary education 10.65 
  
Postsecondary nontertiary education 3.09 
  
Upper secondary education 30.39 
  
Lower secondary vocational education 7.39 
  
Gymnasium 0.03 
  
Primary vocational education  36.37 
  
Primary education 12.04 
  
Preprimary education 0.04 
  
Occupationa (percent) 
   
Legislators, senior officials, and managers 6.29 
  
Professionals 6.89 
  
Technicians and associate professionals 15.33 
  
Clerks 11.90 
  
Service workers and shop sales workers 6.44 
  
Craft and related trades workers  27.16 
  
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 14.79 
  
Elementary occupations 11.20 
  
Works in the private sector (percent) 45 
  
Comparison group (percent) 24 
  
Treated group (percent) 76 
  
Observed before reform (percent) 33   
Observed after reform (percent) 67   
 
Characteristics of the household 
(Gross) Current earnings (2005 PLN) 2,260 872 2,019 
(Gross) Expected pension wealth/current earnings 11.78 4.32 11.12 
Number of persons in the household  3.38 1.36 
 
Number of children below the age of 15 0.48 0.79 
 
Household owns the place of residence (percent) 58 
  
Sample size, N 37,404     
Note: The saving rate is defined as available household income minus total 
household expenditure, divided by available household income.  
a Occupation is presented here at the one-digit level.  
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Table 3: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of unadjusted and Q-adjusted 
pension wealth on the household saving rate or log expenditure 
  
 
Panel A OLS   
Saving rate Log expenditure 
Unadjusted pension wealth –0.002 –0.007  
(0.001) (0.002) 
  
  
Panel B  IV  
Saving rate Log expenditure 
Unadjusted pension wealth –0.014 0.016  
(0.004) (0.004) 
  
  
Panel C IV  
Saving rate Log expenditure 
Adjusted pension wealth –0.293 0.339  
(0.084) (0.079) 
  
  
Sample size, N 37,404 37,404 
Note: The column on the left shows estimates of substitution between pension 
wealth and private saving (θ from Equation (2) with the saving rate as the 
dependent variable). The column on the right shows estimated effects of 
pension wealth on log expenditure (θ from Equation (2) with log expenditure 
as the dependent variable).  
Panel A displays OLS estimates. Panel B displays IV estimates, with pension 
wealth instrumented by an interaction term between the “post-reform” dummy 
and the “treated” dummy. Panel C shows IV estimates, with pension wealth 
instrumented as in Panel B and adjusted by the Q-factor. (The first-stage 
regression F-statistic test for weak instruments equals 8,384.) 
Controls include month-of-year dummies, a quadratic polynomial in age, 
gender, number of persons in the household, number of children, marital 
status, education dummies, occupation dummies, a dummy for working in the 
private sector, and a dummy for whether the household owns its place of 
residence. Other variables include a full set of year dummies (with 1998 as the 
omitted category), and a “treated” dummy (if born 1949–58; born 1939–48 is 
the omitted category).  
Robust standard errors clustered by household are in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Heterogeneity analysis: IV estimates of the effect of Q-adjusted 
pension wealth on the household saving rate or log expenditure for selected 
subsamples of households  
Head of household has 
at least tertiary education 
 
Head of household has less 
than tertiary education  
Saving rate Log 
expenditure 
 
Saving rate Log 
expenditure 
Adjusted 
pension wealth 
–1.076 
(0.504) 
 
1.200 
(0.439) 
 
 
–0.252 
(0.084) 
 
0.278 
(0.081) 
 
  
 
Sample size, N 3,983 3,983 
 
33,421 33,421  
Household owns  
the place of residence 
 
Household does not own 
the place of residence  
Saving rate Log 
expenditure 
 
Saving rate Log 
expenditure 
Adjusted 
pension wealth 
–0.276 
(0.121) 
 
0.301 
(0.107) 
 
 
–0.320 
(0.100) 
 
0.380 
(0.117) 
 
  
     
Sample size, N 21,880 21,880 
 
15,524 15,524 
Note: Columns on the left show the estimates of substitution between pension 
wealth and private saving (θ from Equation (2) with the saving rate as the 
dependent variable). Columns on the right show estimated effects of pension 
wealth on log expenditure (θ from Equation (2) with log expenditure as the 
dependent variable). All estimates are obtained by IV, with pension wealth 
adjusted by the Q-factor and instrumented by an interaction term between the 
“post-reform” dummy and the “treated” dummy. Controls are the same as in 
Table 3. Robust standard errors clustered by household are in parentheses.  
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Table 5: Robustness checks: IV estimates of the effect of Q-adjusted pension 
wealth on the household saving rate or log expenditure obtained using 
alternative analysis samples or alternative construction of pension wealth 
Panel A: sample restricted so that the “treated” group has the same size 
as the comparison group  
 Saving rate Log expenditure 
Adjusted pension wealth –0.243 0.271  
(0.106) (0.096) 
Sample size, N 17,708 17,708 
Panel B: sample restricted to cohorts born 1944–53 
 Saving rate Log expenditure 
Adjusted pension wealth –0.390 0.227  
(0.164) (0.150) 
Sample size, N 20,147 20,147 
Panel C: sample restricted to using only years 1998–2003  
Saving rate Log expenditure 
Adjusted pension wealth –0.215 0.286  
(0.098) (0.095) 
Sample size, N 31,149 31,149 
Panel D: sample where male household heads are younger than 61 
years and female household heads are younger than 56 years  
Saving rate Log expenditure 
Adjusted pension wealth –0.283 0.305  
(0.086) (0.081) 
Sample size, N 36,723 36,723 
Panel E: pension wealth calculation assumes that men retire at 55 years 
of age and women at 50 years of age 
 Saving rate Log expenditure 
Adjusted pension wealth –0.432 0.500 
 (0.123) (0.116) 
Sample size, N 37,404 37,404 
Note: The column on the left shows estimates of substitution between pension 
wealth and private saving (θ from Equation (2) with the saving rate as the 
dependent variable). The column on the right shows estimated effects of 
pension wealth on log expenditure (θ from Equation (2) with log expenditure 
as the dependent variable). All estimates are obtained by IV, with pension 
wealth adjusted by the Q-factor and instrumented by an interaction term 
between the “post-reform” dummy and the “treated” dummy. Controls are the 
same as in Table 3. Robust standard errors clustered by household are in 
parentheses.  
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Table 6: Robustness check: IV estimates of the effect of Q-adjusted pension 
wealth on the household saving rate (θ) as a function of the subjective 
discount factor, β  
(1) (2) (3) 
Value of β Mean Q implied by β Estimate of θ implied by β 
0.90 0.076 –0.076  
[0.023, 0.121] 
 
0.96 0.048 –0.203  
[0.028, 0.067] 
 
0.97 0.044 –0.243  
[0.028, 0.060] 
 
0.98 0.040 –0.293  
[0.027, 0.053] 
 
0.99 0.036 –0.354  
[0.026, 0.047] 
 
0.999 0.033 –0.421  
[0.025, 0.042]   
Note: Column (1) lists different values of the subjective discount factor, β, and 
Column (2) shows the corresponding mean Q-factor (with minima and 
maxima in square brackets). Column (3) shows the resulting IV estimate of the 
effect of Q-adjusted pension wealth on the household saving rate (θ from 
Equation (2)). The baseline model (in italics) sets β equal to 0.98, and is the 
same as in Table 3, Panel C.  
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Table 7: Estimates of the degree of substitution between public pension wealth and private saving, selected studies of 
pension reforms using methods similar to this paper  
Study Source of variation in 
pension wealth 
Sample and data Degree of substitution between 
public pension wealth and private 
saving 
Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003 Pension reform in 
Italy 
Employed or retired household heads in the 
Italian Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) in 1989, 1991, 1993, and 
1995, aged 20−65. Subjective discount factor 
set to 0.98 
0.10 for 20−35-year-olds;  
0.75 for 36−45-year-olds;  
0.24 for 46−55-year-olds;  
< 0.10 for 56−65-year-olds. 
Overall substitution between 0.04 
and 0.33. (Table 5, column (3) and 
Table 4) 
Attanasio and Rohwedder 2003 Series of pension 
reforms in the UK 
Exclude households headed by someone self-
employed or retired from the UK Family 
Expenditure Survey in 1974−87. Subjective 
discount factor set to 0.98 
0 for 20−31-year-olds;  
0.55 for 32−42-year-olds;  
0.65 for 43−53-year-olds;  
0.75 for 54−64-year-olds.  
No estimate for overall substitution 
reported. (Table 5, first column) 
Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula 2006 Series of pension 
reforms in Italy 
Employed or self-employed household heads 
in the Italian SHIW in 1989−2002, aged 
20−50. Subjective discount factor set to 0.98 
0.65 overall substitution (Table 9, 
fourth column)  
Aguila 2011 Pension reform in 
Mexico 
Households headed by a person covered by 
Social Security in the Mexican National 
Income and Expenditure Survey in years 
1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. Subjective 
discount factor set to 0.90 
0.55−0.60 overall substitution 
(p.18)  
Feng, He, and Sato 2011 Pension reform in 
China 
Employed, urban households in the 1995 and 
1999 China Household Income Project, aged 
25−59. Subjective discount factor set to 0.98 
0 for 25−39-year-olds;  
0.38 for 40−59-year-olds.  
Overall substitution about 0.20 
(Table 9)  
Notes: The degree of substitution refers to the absolute value of the proportional increase (or decrease) in private saving in response to a decrease (or 
increase) in public pension wealth. Reported estimates from the papers cited.  
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Online Appendix A: Sample, variables, and calculation of 
pension wealth 
In this appendix, we discuss the details of restrictions with respect to the analysis 
sample, computation of lifetime earnings, and the assumptions and steps made in 
the process of calculating future pension benefits and expected pension wealth.  
A.1 Sample selection 
1. In order to reduce the influence of outliers, for each year of the Polish 
Household Budget Surveys (Badanie Budżetów Gospodarstw Domowych, or 
BBGD), we trim the available household income below the 1st and above the 99th 
percentile.  
2. In years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2003, the BBGD contains information on the 
year and month of birth. In other years (1997, 2001, and 2002), we compute it as 
the difference between the year and month of the survey and the current age of the 
respondent reported in years in the data. Additionally, since the BBGD contains a 
small two-observation rolling-panel component, for years 2001 and 2002 for 
some observations, we match the month of birth from the information in 2000 and 
2003 data, respectively.  
3. In the main analysis sample, we keep households whose head was born 
between 1939 and 1958; hence, the year of birth of the household head is within 
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10 years before or 10 years after 1949, the birth year of the first cohort directly 
affected by the reform.  
4. We only include households for which we observe the household head’s 
occupation at the time of the survey. The information on occupations is necessary 
for sample selection and for the computation of lifetime earnings; see Section A.2.  
5. We drop all of the households in which the head or the spouse works in 
farming or in the agricultural industry, or in which the main household income 
comes from agriculture.  
6. We exclude households in which the head or the spouse works in the following 
occupations: the armed forces, legislators, miners, or educators. We do this 
because these occupations have special pension arrangements.  
7. We exclude households where the head receives earnings from being self-
employed because of the insufficient reliability of self-employment earnings 
information and the lack of details on the level of their pension contributions.  
8. We drop households whose main source of income is retirement or disability 
pensions and those in which the household head receives income from these 
sources.  
9. The final sample consists of 37,404 observations, with about 4,100–6,250 
observations in each year of data.  
A.2 Lifetime earnings profiles 
In order to estimate the lifetime earnings profiles, we use households whose head 
was born between 1937 and 1980; each year, the sample is restricted to include 
18- to 65-year-old male household heads and 18- to 60-year-old female household 
heads. Earnings in the BBGD are measured net of taxes and Social Security 
contributions. We use the SIMPL tax–benefit microsimulation model for Poland 
(see Bargain et al. (2007)) to gross up net earnings so they include taxes and 
Social Security contributions. We define total earnings for each person as the sum 
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of earnings from temporary and permanent employment in the private and public 
sectors, and we express all values in 2005 constant prices.  
We forecast log earnings separately for household heads and spouses using 
the 1997–2003 waves of the BBGD. For household heads, we calculate the 
earnings profiles by estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the 
earnings of the household head on age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
interaction between gender and marital status, education level, occupation 
dummies, industry dummies, year dummies, and indicators for decade of birth. 
The last category is controlled for in order to allow cohort-specific intercepts to 
reflect differences in cohort productivity. We use the predicted log earnings 
profile to forecast expected earnings for each household head, given his (her) 
characteristics, from the age the head of household was at the time, starting at 23 
(25) and going until 65 (60).  
We transform predicted log earnings to earnings in levels by using the 
exponential function, in which we multiply the exponentiated predicted log 
earnings by exp(σ2/2), σ2 being the square of the root mean square error (RMSE) 
of the regression.  
We model the log earnings process separately for female and male spouses. 
For female spouses, we forecast the log earnings profiles using a Heckman 
selection correction. This is done to include the large number of zero earnings of 
this group. The earnings of the spouse are regressed on age, age squared, 
education level, indicators for decade of birth, and year dummies. The “selection 
equation” for labor force participation (defined as earnings greater than 0) uses 
age, age squared, the number of children in the household who are 14 or younger, 
an interaction term between age and the number of children, level of education, 
and decade-of-birth dummies. For male spouses, we estimate log earnings profiles 
by an OLS regression of the earnings of the male spouse on age, age squared, 
education level, indicators for decade of birth, and year dummies. We use the 
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predicted log earnings profiles to forecast earnings for each spouse using the 
transformation described above, given his (her) characteristics, from the age the 
spouse was at the time, starting at 23 (25) and going until 65 (60).  
When computing the lifetime earnings profiles, we assume that, except for age 
and its square, all the current characteristics are fixed and the profile changes with 
age and its square.  
A.3 Pension benefit and pension wealth calculation 
We calculate future public pension benefits based on the entitlement that 
individuals will have acquired by the time they transition into old-age retirement 
according to the legislation at the time of the observation. Hence, the changes 
induced by the pension reform will reflect on expected pension benefits in the 
years 1999–2003. In 1997 and 1998, expected pension benefits are calculated 
according to the pre-reform legislation.  
Pre-reform pension benefits 
In the pre-reform system (see Chłoń-Domińczak 2002), the old-age pension 
formula consisted of a common economy-wide component and an individual 
earnings-based component.  
The common economy-wide component of the pension benefit consisted of 24 
percent of economy-wide average earnings. The individual earnings-based 
component was based on the individual’s 10 best consecutive years of work out of 
the 20 years prior to retirement. This individual-based average was then 
multiplied by the number of years of work contributions and by 1.3 percent. In the 
pre-reform system, nonwork contributory years also counted (e.g. years spent in 
college, in military service, and on maternity leave), and the individual-based 
average was multiplied by a factor of 0.7 percent. In the pre-reform system, there 
were also a minimum pension and a maximum. The individual earnings-based 
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component was capped at a maximum of 2.5 times economy-wide average 
earnings. The minimum pension benefit was set at 35 percent of economy-wide 
average earnings.  
Specifically, we compute the pre-reform pension benefit as 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =
max{0.35𝐵𝐴, 0.24𝐵𝐴 + min{𝐶𝐴𝐸, 2.5𝐵𝐴} × (0.013𝐶𝑊 + 0.007𝐶𝑁𝑊)}. BA 
stands for the “basic amount,” the average economy-wide earnings published by 
the Polish Statistical Office, Główny Urząd Statystyczny (GUS); CAE stands for 
“countable average earnings,” based on the average of the 10 best years of work 
contributions out of the last 20 years; CW stands for years of work contributions, 
which were at least 20 years for women and 25 for men; and CNW stands for years 
of nonwork contributions (e.g. military service or maternity leave), which were 
limited to a maximum of one-third of the total number of years of contributions.  
Assumptions for computing pre-reform benefits. We compute the 10 best years 
of each individual based on the forecast lifetime earnings profiles described in 
Section A.2. In our calculations, we assume that men and women contribute fully 
to the system, according to the pre-reform legislation: 25 years of work 
contributions for men and 20 for women. We also assume that men have three 
years of nonwork contributions (at the time, there was two years’ compulsory 
military service) and that women have five years of nonwork contributions. We 
assume that women retire at age 60 and men at 65. Since the pre-reform minimum 
pension benefit was benchmarked to the economy-wide average earnings 
published by GUS, we assume that this economy-wide average grows by 4 
percent annually in real terms.  
Post-reform pension benefits and initial capital 
The cohorts we study who have participated for at least one year in the pre-reform 
system were entitled to an “initial capital” sum that converted the contributions 
they had made so far into a starting capital sum, beginning in 1999 for the 
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reformed notionally defined contribution (NDC) plan; Chłoń-Domińczak (2002, 
126) provides a detailed explanation of how the initial capital sum was computed.  
The initial capital consists of an economy-wide component and a person-
specific component. The formula for the economy-wide component of initial 
capital requires computing the following correction factor, CF:  
𝐶𝐹 = min {1, √
𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 1998 − 18
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 18
×
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 1998
𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
},  
where the formula sets retirement age to 60 for women and 65 for men and 
required years of contributions to 20 years and 25 years respectively. The initial 
capital is computed as 0.24  BA  CF  G62, where G62 is the unisex life 
expectancy for a 62-year-old in 1998 and BA is the basic amount, defined above. 
In our calculations, we compute years of contributions as of the end of 1998 as the 
age of an individual in 1998 minus 23 years (minus 25 for women, to account for 
sporadic labor force participation). We compute G62 as a simple average of 62-
year-old men and women’s life expectancy in 1998.  
The person-specific initial capital is computed in the following way. For each 
person, we predict earnings five years back in time and obtain economy-wide 
average earnings for five years back in time. We divide the predicted earnings by 
economy-wide average earnings and compute an average, which we multiply by 
the basic amount for 1999 and by 0.7 percent times the number of years of 
nonwork contributions up to 1999 and by 1.3 percent times the number of years of 
work contributions up to 1999. As before, we assume that, given each person’s 
age in 1999 and our assumptions regarding when people start to work, men have 
at most 25 years of work contributions and women have at most 20. Also, as 
before, we assume that given each person’s age in 1999, men have at most three 
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years of nonwork contributions and women have at most five years of nonwork 
contributions. All of our calculations are indexed to 2005 constant prices.  
For the years after the 1999 reform until the year of retirement, we calculate 
contributions as 19.52 percent of an individual’s gross earnings (the legislated 
level of retirement contributions from 1999). We compute the post-reform 
pension benefit as 
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙+0.1952 ∑ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡=1999
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
. 
The minimum pension benefit is defined as 24 percent of average economy-
wide earnings in the year of retirement (Chłoń-Domińczak and Strzelecki 2013).  
Finally, for the first five cohorts of women affected by the reform, we 
compute the pension benefit according to the mixed pre-reform and post-reform 
pension formula described in Table A.1.  
Assumptions for computing post-reform benefits. We assume that men 
contribute continuously until they retire at 65 years of age and that women 
contribute continuously until they retire at 60. The pension benefit is computed as 
the sum of person-specific and economy-wide initial capital and the contributions 
of an individual’s earnings divided by the remaining unisex life expectancy at the 
statutory age of retirement.  
 
Pension wealth 
The general formula for computing pension wealth is the following:  
𝑃𝑊(𝑖) = ∑
𝑝𝑟𝜏|𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑖) × 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑖) × (1 + 𝑔)
𝜏−𝑟𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑔𝑒
(1 + 𝑟)𝑟𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑔𝑒−𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑖)
,
𝑚𝑎𝑥.𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝜏=𝑟𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑔𝑒
 
where 
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• PW(i): pension wealth of individual i; 
• ret.age: retirement age, set at 65 for men and 60 for women; 
• g: real growth rate of pension benefit; 
• r: real interest rate; 
• max.age: maximum attainable age, set at 100 years (the end of the life table); 
• 𝑝𝑟𝜏|𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑖): the probability that someone aged age(i) will be alive at age 𝜏 = 
ret.age, . . . , max.age; 
• benefit(i): pension benefit of individual i, computed as described above.  
Assumptions for computing pension wealth. When calculating pension wealth, 
we adjust the future stream of pension benefits using separate male and female 
survival probabilities from the 1999 Polish life tables from GUS. The maximum 
age is also taken from the life tables and is set to 100 years for everyone. If a 
spouse receives retirement or disability benefits, we use those to compute pension 
wealth. We use a 3 percent real interest rate to compute the present value of the 
sum of expected benefits.  
We compute pension benefits separately for the household head and the 
spouse and then take their sum. For female household heads, we scale the pension 
wealth by 30 percent to account for expected survivor’s pension benefits. The 
actuarially-adjusted sum of future pension benefits of the household head and the 
spouse is discounted back to the current age of the household head. In all of the 
regressions, pension wealth is divided by predicted (fitted) current gross 
household earnings, obtained from the predicted values using the estimation 
described in section A.2.  
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Table A.1: Between-cohort variation in the post-reform pension system 
Cohorts: Born before December 31, 
1948 
Born between January 1, 1949 and December 31, 1968  
(transitory cohorts) 
Born on or after January 1, 
1969 
Benefit formula: Pre-reform formula Post-reform formula with some exceptions Post-reform formula 
Exceptions to the benefit formula? No Separate rules for the first five cohorts of women (born 
1949–53)a 
No 
The 1949 cohort receives part of the benefit according to 
the old pension system formula (80 percent) and the rest 
according to the new formula (20 percent). 
The 1950 cohort receives a 70/30 percent mix. 
The 1951 cohort receives a 55/45 percent mix. 
The 1952 cohort receives a 35/65 percent mix. 
The 1953 cohort receives a 20/80 percent mix. 
     
Early retirement provisions? Yes Yes, conditional on age and contribution requirement 
being fulfilled before December 31, 2007 
No early retirement 
provisions. In the post-
reform system, men retire 
at 65 and women at 60  
a From Chłoń, Góra, and Rutkowski (1999, 21).  
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Online Appendix B: Sample selection and some results 
for the data pooled for the years 1995−2003  
The principal sample selection criteria are the same as for the main sample 
(described in Online Appendix A). Since for the years 1995 and 1996 we do not 
have information on occupation, selection criteria with respect to this variable 
cannot be applied. Thus, points 4, 5, and 6 from the list of sample restrictions 
given in Section A.1 do not apply. The final sample consists of 53,635 
observations, with about 4,215–8,595 observations in each year of data.  
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Figure B.1: Estimated effect of the 1999 pension reform on saving rate and log 
expenditure, by year 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations using the BBGD, 1995–2003. The universe consists of BBGD for the 
years 1995−2003 for households whose head was born between 1939 and 1958. The sample also 
omits households whose head works in agriculture (forestry, fishery, and farming), mining, or the 
education sector. The figure shows point estimates from a multiyear difference-in-differences 
regression of the outcome variable on a “treated” dummy (if born 1949–58), eight year dummies, 
treated-by-year interaction terms, and controls. The controls consist of a cubic polynomial in age, 
a gender dummy, number of persons in the household, number of children, marital status, 
education dummies, and industry dummies. Each panel presents the treated-by-year interaction 
point estimate over time. The omitted categories are year 1998 (the year before the reform) and the 
comparison group born 1939–48. The regression uses robust standard errors clustered by year of 
birth and the figure presents 95 percent confidence intervals (whiskers). The dashed vertical line 
indicates the first year of the reform.  
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Figure B.2: Mean saving rate, by year and group  
 
Note: Authors’ calculations using the BBGD, 1995–2003. Saving rate is defined as available 
household income minus total household expenditure, divided by available household income. The 
dashed line indicates the “comparison group,” born 1939–48, and the solid line indicates the 
“treated group,” born 1949–58. The dashed vertical line indicates the first year of the reform.  
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